Peru’s ethnolinguistic diversity is a resource fiercely promoted by the mass media, as well as by many of the country’s politicians. The desire to recognize and encourage diversity has brought forth several government-sponsored programs, such as Intercultural Bilingual Education (EIB) and the Week of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity created by Peru’s Ministry of Culture (Ministerio de Cultura del Perú, 2015). However, beyond this promotion, it is difficult to analyze at a deep level the beliefs of most Peruvians regarding their multilingual, multicultural reality. Some attempts to uncover these opinions include methods such as interviews and surveys; however, given that these events are situated in and of themselves, they often result in results that are either performances for the researcher (Back, 2015) or filtered through the researcher’s lens of questions and prompts.

To gain a more accurate perspective on Peruvian views of multilingualism and multiculturalism, it is important to have access to discourses that occur without researcher involvement. In this case, the virtual environments of the so-called Web 2.0, such as Twitter and Facebook, offer researchers an opportunity to witness the production and negotiation of beliefs around a variety of themes, including those dealing with language and culture. These spaces are rich for the analysis of numerous opinions, ideologies, and beliefs unmediated by external influence. For that reason, analyzing the discourse of Web 2.0 participants allows us to see ideologies and beliefs of race and language that exist due to—and in spite of—the previously mentioned government initiatives.

To date, there have been significant advances in the literature regarding racialized discourses on Peruvian Facebook, such as Brañez (2012) and Wong (2014), who have also contributed chapters to this book. However, there are still few studies that analyze how ideologies of race and language are constructed on Twitter, particularly in the case of languages other than English (however, see Barton & Lee, 2013, for an important exception). Twitter is a microblog space in which participants are restricted to a certain amount of characters per tweet (previously 140, but recently increased to 280). When examining the data regarding users in Peru, we note that in 2015 there were four million Peruvian Twitter accounts, compared to 14.5...
million Peruvian Facebook accounts, a number that no doubt has risen in the past few years and does not include individuals from the Peruvian diaspora (Gestión, 2015; Perú21, 2015). Though fewer than Facebook, Peruvian Twitter users published an average of 11,000 Tweets per hour in 2015, making this particular platform quite productive for observing real time opinions about certain events.

In this chapter I explore the diversity of reactions found on Peruvian Twitter to two discursive events that occurred in Quechua. The first event was a greeting in the language used by presidential candidate Keiko Fujimori during a presidential debate in May of 2011, which generated mostly negative reactions. The second event is composed of a series of tweets in Quechua by the soccer player Claudio Pizarro during the Copa America soccer tournament in 2015, which resulted in mainly positive reactions. In my analysis I show that the reactions to Fujimori’s greeting are defined by a highly racialized language, as participants negated her right to speak Quechua by emphasizing her Asian roots. On the other hand, I note the near absence of racialized discourses in the reactions to Pizarro’s tweets. Despite this difference, both categories of reactions contained essentialist messages about multilingualism and the capacity to speak Quechua. By highlighting the presence and absence of racialized terms, I show that these differences do not only have to do with the contexts of the events, but also with underlying essentialized ideologies around race, ethnicity, and language.

In the following section I discuss the theoretical and methodological frameworks that I used to analyze these data, including theories of racism and citizen sociolinguistics (Rymes & Leone, 2014). Afterwards, I offer more details about the two events and the methods of data collection and analysis before proceeding to the findings. I conclude with a discussion on the implications for negotiating ideologies of language and race in Peru.

Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks

The interactive, almost synchronous quality of discourse on Twitter requires a careful definition of the concepts of community and interaction in this context, beyond the more generalized studies that have been conducted on these themes (Huberman, Romero, & Wu, 2009; Java, Song, Finin, & Seng, 2007; Honeycutt & Herring, 2009; Hermida, 2010; Zappavigna, 2012; Graham, Jackson, & Broersma, 2014). What we do know from these previous studies is that Twitter has been used mainly to promote, discuss, and create affiliative spaces. However, there is some debate as to whether these spaces are more inclusive or more restrictive compared to non-virtual environments. For example, Huberman, Romero, and Wu (2009) posited that virtual environments, instead of inviting a diversity of opinions, can result in interactions restricted to “those few that matter and that reciprocate [participant] attention” (p. 1). Recent research on US President Donald Trump’s use of Twitter has expanded upon this assessment, taking an even more negative
view of the platform. Researchers have concluded that Trump’s Twitter style heralds a “counter-trend” in political discourse “towards de-professionalism and even amateurism” (Enli, 2017) and, more generally, that “Twitter privileges discourse that is simple, impulsive, and uncivil” (Ott, 2016, p. 59). On the other hand, some researchers of politics on Twitter have found that politicians who use Twitter in a more interactive manner (versus the one-way proclamations characteristic of President Trump) end up fostering increased dialogue with a wider variety of people (Graham, Jackson, & Broersma, 2014).

Whether affiliative spaces on Twitter are characterized by positive or negative interactions, the unique quality of this platform allows researchers to undergo a careful analysis of how opinions develop in real time, as well as observe the hierarchies that develop inside these discussions. With an analysis of markers of popularity and hierarchy such as retweets, favorites, and replies, it is possible to not only witness the evolution of a discussion, but also analyze the impact that this discussion has had among even passive observers of any given interaction. Twitter also offers the possibility of categorizing discussions through tools such as hashtags (permitting anyone to follow published tweets on a particular theme), retweets (which amplify and share comments and opinions related to a conversation), and tagging other participants by incorporating their Twitter handle into a tweet. Moreover, the character restriction and the almost synchronic nature of interactions on Twitter limit both the production and reception of each tweet.

Interactions on Twitter can be characterized by what Du Bois (2007) and Jaffe (2009) have termed stance taking. This notion does not only refer to the position taken with respect to the content of the message, but also with respect to the interlocutor. In this way, these interactions can also be viewed as performances by participants who keenly recognize the presence of an audience (Barton & Lee, 2013; Bauman & Briggs, 1990). Interactions on Twitter are rich in stance taking and performance, which are observable through discourse analysis. Discursive resources that index attitudes regarding what is said and to whom include hedges such as “I think” and “I suppose,” value expressions such as “I love it” or “I like it,” the use of images or emoticons, and translanguaging or language alternation, among other elements. These postures are created and renegotiated by participants in highly collaborative ways.

When these interactions occur around linguistic themes, the resulting stances taken and performances correspond to what Rymes and Leone (2014) termed “citizen sociolinguistics,” which focuses on how participants debate and evaluate topics regarding language and society. Citizen sociolinguistics is a methodological approach that analyzes participant linguistic ideologies and opinions as they emerge in daily discourse, mainly in the social media platforms of Web 2.0. This approach goes beyond the traditional contexts of speech community, country, or region of traditional sociolinguistics. Observing citizen interactions in this spontaneous way removes
researchers from traditional hierarchies, permitting view of ideologies unfettered by analytical filters or traditional methods such as interviews and surveys. However, it is important to mention that this sociolinguistic approach “by and for” citizens, instead of defying linguistic, racial, and ethnic stereotypes, often reinforces those same beliefs, as we will see in the analysis to follow.

Similarly, ideologies of race and language do not exist in isolation offline; in fact, as Daniels (2013) outlined, race and racism persist in virtual environments in both unique and well-established forms. Within Web 2.0 tools such as social media sites, we can observe a continuity of the categories proposed by Van Dijk (2002, 2005) in his research on racialized discourses; that is, discourses of difference, of deviance, and of threat. According to Van Dijk, these categories increase in their level of negativity, although all three types of discourses can cause harm to the marginalized subject of the discourse. Discourses of difference position a minority individual or group as other, or as someone profoundly different from the speaker; one example would be emphasizing the cultural differences between indigenous and European-origin Peruvians, without considering their similarities. Discourses of deviance portray the actions of an individual or group as beyond the norm, as if this individual or group were acting in a way that they “shouldn’t” according to the associations that the speaker has with their perceived race. An example of this discourse would be laughing at a person of a particular race who speaks a language that is not commonly associated with that race. Finally, discourses of threat are the most pernicious, portraying the individual or group as aggressive, criminal, or “dangerous” with respect to the values of the dominant culture. A clear example of this discourse is President Trump’s categorization of Mexicans and Central Americans as rapists and drug dealers.

In the analysis to follow I focus on the first two categories proposed by Van Dijk (2002, 2005). I show how these ideologies influence the discourses surrounding Keiko Fujimori’s greeting in Quechua and how this greeting is positioned as something abnormal and laughable. By comparing these reactions with those surrounding Claudio Pizarro’s tweets in Quechua, we note that the reactions to Pizarro constructed the soccer player as an “acceptable” user of Quechua, even though he is also a non-indigenous, non-speaker of the language. I analyze how citizen sociolinguistics operates in these discussions, as well as the implications for overall attitudes towards multilingualism and race in Peru. Before this, however, I contextualize the analyzed discursive events and describe my data collection and analysis methods.

Discursive Events and Methods of Analysis

As mentioned in the introduction, this analysis was spurred by two discursive events that occurred within four years of each other. The first event took place during Peru’s 2011 presidential campaign. From the start, this
campaign was characterized by an extremely diverse slate of candidates, including an ex-president of indigenous origin (Alejandro Toledo), a banker of Polish descent with dual citizenship in Peru and the United States (Pedro Pablo Kuczynski), an ex-military official with phenotypically indigenous traits (Ollanta Humala), and the daughter of ex-president Alberto Fujimori, of Japanese origin (Keiko Fujimori). During the last weeks of the campaign, the slate of candidates was reduced to Ollanta Humala and Keiko Fujimori; the discursive event under analysis occurred during their second and final debate.

During this second round of debates, Fujimori began a response to Humala with the following greeting in Quechua: “Allillanchu, warmikuna, llactamasicuna.” The Spanish translation of this greeting, according to several mass media sources, was “Greetings to our countrymen and women. We are of our own land” (Foros Perú, 2011). Some online discussion forums changed the translation to “Greetings to our countrymen and women,” eliminating the expression “we are of our own land” (Foros Perú, 2011). This second translation appears closer to the original Quechua. It is difficult to ascertain if the source of the first translation was Fujimori’s campaign staff or if it was conducted by a journalist, as the reports on the event do not specify the origin. Although the translation and the amount of discussion surrounding what Fujimori actually meant to say in Quechua could constitute its own study, in this chapter I will concentrate specifically on the reactions on Twitter after this greeting was broadcast on television.

The second discursive event happened four years afterwards, when the Peruvian national soccer team participated in the Copa America soccer tournament, organized by Chile in 2015. During a period when Peru was winning multiple games, the captain of the team, Claudio Pizarro, published four tweets in Quechua. Although his first tweet contained only two words in Quechua—sonqoypi apayquichis [I carry you in my heart]—the following tweets were much more extensive in their use of the language and also included some Spanish, as we see in Figure 9.1.

In this series of tweets, Pizarro used a discourse of unity similar to Fujimori’s—including the same word used in her greeting, “llactamasicuna” [countryman, compatriots]—as well as “cusi” [happy], “ganunahuan” [with you all], and “kausachun” [long live]. Pizarro explained that, even though he did not speak Quechua, it had always interested him and for that reason he had started to “put words together” after the games using online translation software and the assistance of his teammate Edwin Retamoso and one of the team’s physiotherapists, both of whom spoke Quechua (Perú.com, 2015a). Fujimori never offered an explanation for her use of Quechua, although general knowledge of her background implies that she was raised with limited, if any, exposure to the language.

The reactions to these two discursive events varied widely. In 2011, the reaction to Fujimori’s Quechua greeting was considerably negative, not only on Twitter but among media sources as well. One web page categorized the
greeting as “una burda estrategia para ocultar su ausencia de una política seria a favor de la multiculturalidad y el plurilingüismo [a coarse strategy to hide (Fujimori’s) absence of serious policies in favor of multiculturalism and plurilingualism]” (Servindi, 2011). Yet Pizarro’s use of Quechua was seen as positive; his tweets were retweeted and favorited thousands of times; Pizarro himself was awarded a prize from Chile’s National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI) for “promoting the Quechua language” (Perú.com, 2015b).

I began to collect reactions on Twitter to Fujimori’s greeting two days following the presidential debate. I conducted a search for all tweets mentioning the word “Quechua” and saved screenshots of the results, including all tweets that used the word in reference to the presidential debate and that appeared from seconds after the greeting until 26 hours after the debate. Afterwards, I divided the tweets into three categories: original tweets, retweets with added comments, and retweets without added comments. Of 530 total tweets I arrived at a corpus of 459 tweets that were either original or retweets with added comments. Using this corpus, I created a chronology showing the number of tweeted reactions to the greeting over time.
Given the differing origins of these discursive events (Fujimori’s on television, Pizarro’s on Twitter), my analysis of Pizarro’s tweets in Quechua took a slightly different form. First, I focused on those reactions that tagged Pizarro’s Twitter handle (@pizarrinha), indicating a direct response. Later, I separated out the responses that either made reference to Quechua or used Quechua. With this separation, from the 728 original responses I was left with 136 tweets that were either direct responses or retweets with added comments. As these tweets took place over the course of two weeks (from June 16 to July 3, 2015), I did not conduct a chronological, minute-by-minute analysis, although I did note that the number of responses was greatest with Pizarro’s second tweet and began to decrease with the third and fourth tweets.

To analyze these data, I began to categorize the tweets according to affective stance as demonstrated in the lexicon of each tweet, following Van Dijk’s (2002) structural analysis of racist discourse. For example, tweets categorized as positive with respect to Fujimori’s use of Quechua contained words such as “bien [good],” “ganó [she won],” or even extended sports metaphors such as “golazo [great goal]” or “puntazo [major points].” In the case of Pizarro, words such as “bien [good]” or “grande [great]” in Spanish, or “allin [good]” “jatun [great],” “causachun [long live]” or “wichay [up with]” in Quechua, were examples of words that categorized tweets as positive. There were only five responses in Quechua to Fujimori’s greeting, while responses to Pizarro’s tweets in Quechua numbered over 50. On the other hand, tweets categorized as taking a negative stance towards Fujimori’s greeting included words such as “falsa [false],” “hipócrita [hypocrite]” or “mal [bad].” With respect to Pizarro’s tweets, the few negative reactions contained a diversity of vocabulary that was difficult to categorize; I mention specific examples in the following section. Moreover, for reasons that I will explain further on in this chapter, I also incorporated the majority of tweets that used orthographic indicators of laughter (e.g., “jajaja” o “jeje”) as reflecting a negative affective stance.

There were several groups of tweets that I found difficult to classify according to affective stance. In the case of Fujimori, the majority of these tweets fell into a category that I called “neutral/surprised.” The neutral tweets simply expressed the fact that Fujimori had spoken in Quechua, while the surprised tweets used words such as “¿cómo? [what?],” “¡asu! [whoa!],” “¡manya! [no way!]” and other expressions that, although strong words, were difficult to classify as positive or negative. In the case of Pizarro, the tweets that were not easily classified as positive or negative were mainly expressions of confusion or a lack of comprehension, such as “no entendí [I didn’t understand]” or “traductor por favor [translator, please];” I placed these tweets in a category called “didn’t understand.” There were also some tweets that expressed more neutral sentiments (e.g., “@pizarrinha es condecorado en Chile por sus tuits en quechua @pizarrinha is honored in Chile for his tweets in Quechua], by @cale67), were direct translations of the message in Quechua with no additional comment or mentioned the language Pizarro used as “Chilean” or “Guatemalan.” I placed these tweets in a general category of “other.”
In addition to this categorization, I employed a deeper qualitative analysis of the tweets using constructivist grounded theory in order to analyze the content beyond affective stance (Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz’s approach to Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) original conception of grounded theory emphasized the researcher’s position as “the author of a reconstruction of experience and meaning” (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006, p. 2). That is, although my analysis is based on the data, I recognized my own role of as a constructor of meaning influenced by my previous knowledge of and experiences with computer-mediated discourse. I used this method to arrive at common themes among the comments before connecting these themes with the theoretical frameworks of racist discourse. In the section to follow, I present both the quantitative and qualitative results.

Findings

Quantitative Analysis

Tweets reacting to Fujimori’s greeting in Quechua began a few moments after the greeting was broadcast on television, around 8:54 P.M. Lima time on May 29, 2011. The most productive minute of this discussion was one minute later, when 182 tweets were published. At 8:58 the number of tweets dropped considerably, with a slight increase between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M. This increase corresponded with the broadcast of the popular television talk show Bayly by author and journalist Jaime Bayly, who devoted that evening’s program to the presidential debate. Many tweets during that hour mentioned Bayly’s comments about Fujimori’s use of Quechua or cited him directly. The final tweets regarding the debate occurred the morning of the following day.

When categorizing these tweets, we note that the majority of them (60%) took a negative affective stance towards the greeting in Quechua, while both the positive and neutral/surprised stances represented 40% of the total (see Figure 9.2).

The chronology of the categorized tweets shows that neutral/surprised comments occurred with greater frequency during the first minutes after the greeting. At the same time, positive comments also appeared during these first minutes and in small quantities throughout the evening. Negative stances were overall the most constant, numerous, and retweeted during the 26 hours of this discursive event (see Figure 9.3).

In stark contrast to the reactions to Fujimori’s greeting, responses to Pizarro’s tweets in Quechua took a mostly positive affective stance (77%). Negative reactions only constituted 7% of the comments, those that indicated a lack of understanding comprised 12%, and other reactions (neutral, classifications of the language used as “Guatemalan,” “Chilean,” etc.) represented 4% of all tweets (see Figure 9.4).

If we separate the reactions to Pizarro by tweet, we note that, although there was some variation in responses to the second and third tweet, most
Figure 9.2 Categorization of Twitter Reactions to Fujimori’s Greeting in Quechua, May 29, 2011.

Figure 9.3 Number of Positive, Negative, and Neutral/Surprised Tweets in the First Five Minutes After Fujimori’s Greeting in Quechua.
Finally, observing the quantity of retweets and favorites of Pizarro’s tweets in Quechua is another way to document positive affective stance taking. Pizarro’s four tweets were retweeted 8,855 times and favorited 11,890 times. Although retweets do not automatically imply a positive stance, research demonstrates that those who retweet normally do so in order to share something that has caught their attention; to extend or highlight a particular news item; or to feel part of a particular virtual community (Noriega, 2014). In Figure 9.6 we see the quantity of retweets and favorites per tweet. Obviously, it was not possible to conduct the same analysis with respect to Fujimori’s greeting in Quechua, because this took place orally on television.

With these initial quantitative results, we already note a great difference in the reactions surrounding Fujimori and Pizarro’s use of Quechua. With respect to Fujimori’s greeting, the affective stance taken on Twitter was, from the first minute, mostly negative. Although there was an important percentage of tweets that informed, expressed surprise, or declared a “point” for Fujimori for her use of Quechua, negative stances dominated the discourse on Twitter. Moreover, the few retweets were also dedicated to republishing negative reactions.

With respect to Pizarro, reactions were quite positive to each tweet that he published in Quechua. Although some alternative reactions began to appear with the publication of the second tweet, these reactions mainly reflected a lack of comprehension rather than a negative response. The variation of responses to the second, third, and fourth tweet can also be explained by the
Figure 9.5 Number of Reactions to Pizarro’s Tweet, Per Category and Per Tweet.

Figure 9.6 Reaction to Pizarro’s Tweets by Retweet or Favorite.
increase of these responses, compared to the first tweet which only earned nine direct responses regarding the use of Quechua.

To discuss in more detail the content of the affective stances taken in reaction to the use of Quechua in these discursive events, I outline the qualitative analysis in the following section.

Qualitative Analysis

Beginning with Fujimori’s greeting in Quechua, we note that the most prominent themes of the reactions on Twitter not only referred to the political nature of using a Peruvian indigenous language to greet one’s potential constituents (which emerged in both the positive and negative tweets), but also transmitted certain ideologies regarding multilingualism, race, and racism, as well as a profound discomfort around the use of Quechua by a Peruvian of Japanese descent. We can classify the negative reactions in four categories: falseness, discourses of deviance, poor Quechua, and the use of the language as a secret code.

Many participants believed that Fujimori had used Quechua in a false or even hypocritical way. The absence of sincerity in this greeting was mentioned several times, as we see in the following examples:

@CHOONI: No me jodas! ni cagando te creo que hablas quechua pues [Don’t fuck with me! You’re shitting me that that you speak Quechua] (May 29, 2011, 8:54 p.m.)

@STUARTFLORES: Me llega al pincho q utilicen el quechua para que-rer aparentar peruanidad [I get so pissed off when (people) use Quechua to try to act Peruvian] (May 29, 2011, 8:55 p.m.)

@HEZUO: ya no diremos “más falso que cachetada de payaso” sino “más falso que china hablando quechua” #dp2011 [We’ll no longer say “falser than a clown’s slap” but “falser than a Chinese woman speaking quechua”] (May 29, 2011, 9:51 p.m.)

@CLAUMDD: El saludo en quechua y lenguaje de señas de Keiko me sono [sic] tan armado e hipocrita! [Keiko’s greeting in Quechua and sign language sounded so planned and hypocritical!] (May 29, 2011, 10:23 p.m.)

The last comment was referring to the end of the debate, when Fujimori ended her speech with a phrase in sign language that was translated to Spanish as “I will work together with all of you” (Foros Perú, 2011). Although not the focus of this analysis, it is important to mention that Fujimori’s use of sign language was also interpreted as something false by many participants.
on Twitter, although this event did not receive as many reactions as the
greeting in Quechua.

The possible reason behind this perceived falseness was explored in other
tweets. Many participants attributed the greeting in Quechua to a political
strategy aimed at winning votes among the indigenous population in Peru. A
forced sterilization campaign targeting indigenous women propagated by Fuji-
mori’s father, Alberto Fujimori, was mentioned several times as a contrast to
the greeting (e.g., “Me parece una cochinada que la hija de un esterilizador de
indígenas empieze [sic] su saludo en quechua [I think it’s sick that the daughter
of a sterilizer of indigenous women would start her greeting in Quechua]” @
Peruanista, May 29, 2011, 8:56 p.m.). Other participants stated that a mere
greeting was not sufficient for indigenous Peruvians; in the words of Twit-
ter user @rnmp: “Si tu [sic] hablaras quechua, solo entenderías el saludo y te
joderías con el resto del debate [if you spoke Quechua, you would only under-
stand the greeting and fuck the rest of the debate]” (May 29, 2011, 9:00 p.m.).

This last comment also highlighted a linguistic ideology that conceives
of Quechua monolingualism as the norm in Peru. According to @rnmp
and other commenters, speaking Quechua implies not speaking Japanese,
Spanish, or any other language. This ideology has been explored by Zavala,
Mujica, Córdova, and Ardito (2014) and Huayhua (2014, this volume),
who discussed in greater detail the belief that a Quechua speaker speaks
the language due to being poor, illiterate, and not knowing Spanish. For the
commenters on Twitter, the presence of a political figure such as Fujimori
giving a greeting in Quechua, a language deemed “exclusively” for indige-
nous people, deviated strongly from what she “should” have been speaking.
In fact, many commenters recommended that she speak Asian languages, as
we see in the following examples:

@CRUNCHES: o ta que no entiendo, Keiko habló en Quechua o en
Chino? [I don’t get it, Keiko spoke in Quechua or Chinese?]
(May 29, 2011, 8:57 p.m.)

@ELMURWILBER: @JetMail2011 keiko en ves [sic] de pretender
hablar quechua por que no hablas japonés? [Keiko, instead of pretend-
ing to speak Quechua, why don’t you speak Japanese?]
(May 29, 2011, 8:59 p.m.)

@APINTOP: suena raro una japonesa hablando en quechua [A Japa-
nese woman speaking Quechua sounds weird].
(May 29, 2011 de 9:51 p.m.)

Some comments in this category also used onomatopoeic indications of
laughter, such as “jajaja” or “jejeje,” which categorized the use of Que-
chua by Fujimori as something laughable, “weird,” or difficult to believe.
Moreover, this discourse of deviance reflected a deeply essentialist discourse
with respect to language use. The opinion that a Japanese woman cannot
or should not speak Quechua and that her opponent Ollanta Humala, of indigenous origins, should (several tweets did ask why he did not speak Quechua during the debate) demonstrated ideologies that linked racial and ethnic characteristics to the use of a particular language. In other words, Fujimori should speak Japanese, or even any other Asian language—but not Quechua. We also see this ideology in the comments about the quality of Quechua spoken by Fujimori, which was evaluated as “mal pronunciado” [badly pronounced] (@wagnerbenavides), “hiper hiper básico” [hyper hyper basic] (@renzolinares) and that it “sonó a koreano [sic]” [sounded like Korean] (@Martincornejop). The most retweeted comment in this category was that of a user named @karendaniela, who made a humorous reference to a Japanese salsa group:

@KARENDANIELA: Keiko hablando en Quechua me recordó a Orquesta de la Luz que cantaba en Castellano [Keiko speaking Quechua reminded me of Orquesta de la Luz who sang in Spanish]

(May 29, 2011, 8:59 p.m.)

It is also important to mention that the few reactions in Quechua to Fujimori’s greeting were mainly negative, with a few neutral reactions among them. While the neutral comments simply transcribed what Fujimori had said, the negative reactions either indexed laughter (“jajaja”) with a partial quote of the greeting; insisted that Fujimori had forgotten the basic principles of Inca philosophy “ama llulla, ama sua, ama quilla [do not lie, do not rob, do not be lazy];” or said Fujimori’s Quechua was not understood (“manan intindiquichu runa simita!” by @DRAVIZARRETA).

The final category among the negative reactions portrayed Fujimori’s use of Quechua as a way of transmitting a secret message. Most of the tweets in this category repeated a joke made by Jaime Bayly, who erroneously translated Fujimori’s greeting on his television program that same night as “no liberaré a mi padre el primer año, sino el segundo” [I won’t free my father the first year, but I will the second year]. Other comments speculated on other possibilities for this secret message, as we see in the following examples:

@JUANGAZA: hahahaha esa china xP que dijo en quechua seguiré esterilizándolas? [hahahaha, that Chinese lady, what did she say in Quechua, I’m going to keep sterilizing them?]

(May 29, 2011, 8:54 p.m.)

@JUANJOSE: KF ya comenzó mentando la madre en quechua #DP2011 [KF already started calling us all sons of bitches in Quechua]

(May 29, 2011, 8:55 p.m.)

@K4L3D: nos mandó a la mierda en quechua, no? [she told us all to fuck off in Quechua, didn’t she?]

(29 de mayo de 2011, 8:55 p.m.)
The comments under the category of “Quechua as a secret language” showed the negative affective stance taken by the majority of commenters. By linking this “secret message” with illegal actions (freeing her imprisoned father, sterilizing indigenous people) or with non-professional behavior (insulting voters), these reactions also indicated the perception of a lack of sincerity on the part of Fujimori, as well as the perception of Quechua as a stigmatized language used primarily for devious purposes.

However, there were also positive reactions to Fujimori’s use of Quechua, even though these reactions were not a majority. As I mentioned previously, many of these comments referred to the inclusion of Quechua speakers (e.g., “quechua hablantes y sordomudos valoran la inclusión. No es un gesto, es una obligación!” [Quechua speakers and deaf mutes value the inclusion. It’s not a gesture, it’s an obligation], by @mlukacs), or simply as a good tactic used by Fujimori during the debate. A few comments responded directly to critiques of the greeting, as we see in the following examples:

@GNRFAN: Yo le daría el beneficio de la duda a lo de hablar en Quechua . . . ¿Porqué no lamentamos ser tantos los que ni entendimos que cosa dijo mejor? [I would give the benefit of the doubt to speaking in Quechua . . . why aren’t we instead ashamed of so many of us not understanding what she said?] (May 29, 2011, 8:56 p.m.)

@MANZANAPECAHOR: En el #mundocaviar: Si Humala hablaba en quechua, era justo. Si lo hacia Keiko, es una pendejada [In the #caviarworld: If Humala spoke Quechua, it’s fair. If Keiko did it, it’s trickery] (May 30, 2011, 8:14 p.m.)

Beyond these few comments, reactions to Fujimori’s greeting in Quechua mainly reproduced essentialist ideologies of multilingualism. By portraying the greeting as false and poorly executed, as well as something that Fujimori “shouldn’t” do, the commenters transmitted not only their opinions about Fujimori’s Quechua use, but also ideologies regarding who has the “right” to speak the language. Due to her political past as well as her phenotypical characteristics, it appeared that Fujimori did not have this right, beyond her own intentions for using the language. To see the other side of these ideologies, we turn to the qualitative analysis of reactions to Claudio Pizarro’s tweets in Quechua.

The positive comments about Pizarro’s tweets can be categorized into three general themes: inclusion, identity/authenticity, and promotion of Quechua. Regarding the theme of inclusion, and similar to the few positive comments about Fujimori’s greeting, many commenters made reference to Pizarro’s use of Quechua as something that included the “entire” country.
While some commenters used the word “inclusion” directly, others implied the idea of inclusion with references to “all Peruvians” or similar phrases, or with reference to Quechua speakers. These links occurred most frequently among responses in Quechua, which used the word “wayki” [brother], “Inca,” or other words of inclusion or indigenous pride. Some examples follow:

@QOSQORUNA28: NOKAPIS KANKUNATA LLAPAN SONQOY-WAN NAPAYKUYKICHIS, ALLINTA PUCLLANAYKICHISPAC, PERU LLACTANCHIS JATUN KANANPACii;KAUSACHUN PERÚiii [I also carry you in my heart, greetings, you played well, you are a great Peruvian, long live Peru!]

(June 19, 2015, 4:09 p.m.)

@BUBBLEGUMPERU: ¡me encanta que escribas en quechua, para todos los peruanos! #SiSePuede #VamosPeru [I love that you write in Quechua for all Peruvians #YesWeCan #LetsGoPeru]

(June 21, 2015, 7:11 a.m.)

@ANIBALCORDEROH: ¡Qué grande que es @Pizarrinha! Felicitando al #Perú en la lengua de sus pueblos. [@Pizarrinha is great! Congratulating #Peru in the language of its people]

(July 3, 2015, 8:21 p.m.)

Some tweets also referred to Pizarro’s nickname, “el bombadero de los Andes [the bombardier of the Andes].” This nickname appeared in the many tweets that positioned Pizarro as someone with indigenous origins. Pizarro grew up in Lima, in the northern coastal province of Callao, and had mentioned that he heard words in Quechua spoken by Quechua-speaking employees in his home (Perú.com, 2015a). Although these facts do not show a family link with the language, many of the responses alluding to Pizarro’s identity made a direct connection between the soccer player and Quechua, as we see in the following examples.

@QUIRITIUM: Al estar en Alemania, haz [sic] visto que quiere decir “nacionalismo” bravó!, todos al fíanal [sic] buscamos nuestra identidad. un abrazo [By being in Germany, you have seen what “nationalism” means, at the end we all look for our identity, a hug]

(June 21, 2015, 6:15 a.m.)

@DIABLOSANTUS: Muy bien Claudio Pizarro, aplausos por tu orgullo de expresarte en la lengua de tus ancestros. Muy merecido premio en Temuco [Very good Claudio Pizarro, applause for your pride in expressing yourself in the language of your ancestors. Well-deserved prize in Temuco].

(23 de junio de 2015, 6:31 p.m.)
As seen in these tweets, responses related to Pizarro’s identity classified him as more “authentic,” or linked him with an indigenous, Quechua, or “Inca” identity. The tweet by @quiritium is a noteworthy example, as he/she indicates that Pizarro’s distance from Peru has enabled him to find his identity. The idea of finding an “authentic” identity outside of the country is likely something that spoke to many commenters, many of whom also reside outside of Peru. The search and discovery of identity also serves as an inspiration for these commenters, as we see in the last category in which a positive affective stance was taken.

However, these reactions are also similar to the responses to Fujimori’s greeting in that they imply an essentialist ideology towards language, in the sense that only “authentic” Peruvians can tweet in Quechua. The fact that Pizarro had written these tweets with the help of two native Quechua speakers was mentioned very few times in the responses. These consisted in a few mentions of Edwin Retamoso, as well as questions such as, “¿quién te está ayudando con el quechua?” [who is helping you with Quechua?], but, again, there were very few tweets of this nature. It is interesting to note the little attention paid to the native Quechua speakers who play on the Peruvian national soccer team. Despite Pizarro’s attempts to unify all Peruvians with his tweets in Quechua, the very same speakers of that language appear to have been erased by Pizarro’s own popularity.

Within the last positive category of promoting Quechua, commenters thanked or praised Pizarro for recognizing and elevating the status of Quechua. These commenters used words such as “orgullo” [pride] or referred to Peru’s indigenous roots. Similar to the comments on Pizarro’s identity, many of these responses linked Quechua to Pizarro as a person. It is also important to note that several commenters said that Pizarro’s tweets had motivated them to learn Quechua.
We should not neglect to mention the negative affective stances taken with respect to Pizarro’s tweets in Quechua, although these comprised very few of the total responses. As I discussed previously, these responses implied that Pizarro used an “invented” language, or they used racialized language, associating Quechua with discourses of inferiority and disgust.

We note that the tweet by @the96kopites received an almost immediate response, which caused him/her to clarify that s/he was “joking.” When comparing this exchange to the reactions to Fujimori’s tweet, we see that none of the commenters indicated that their comments were a joke, even the most outwardly racist and hostile ones; that is, there was no attempt to disguise criticism towards Fujimori by portraying it as humorous.

Finally, the majority of responses to Pizarro that did not take an explicitly positive affective stance (around 11%) indicated that they did not understand the tweets. Although these comments could be interpreted as negative, it is important to mention that many of these comments were accompanied...
by positive messages, such as “no entendí nada de lo que escribiste pero te apoyo igual, felicidades Perú! [I don’t understand anything that you wrote but I still support you, congratulations Peru!]” by @KevinSarachoOk. Moreover, some of the comments in this category implied a certain shame or embarrassment on the part of the commenter for not knowing the language, or included emoticons indicating sadness. In other words, the responsibility for understanding the tweets did not appear to fall on Pizarro, but on the commenters themselves or on an absent “traductor [translator].” In fact, several commenters adopted the role of translator and produced translations of the tweets into Spanish, similar to Fujimori’s discursive event.

With this analysis we see not only the difference in stances taken with respect to Fujimori and Pizarro’s use of Quechua, but also an essentialist ethno-racial ideology with respect to the use of this language. In the section to follow I explore some reasons that could explain the differences in reactions to these two events.

Discussion

In this analysis I have compared two discursive events occurring on Twitter in 2011 and 2015. Both speakers used Quechua despite not speaking it as part of their daily linguistic practices. The quantitative and qualitative analysis of reactions to these discursive events show the active participation of citizens promoting linguistic ideologies that, although supportive of Quechua usage in certain cases, still preserve essentialist beliefs with respect to who has the “right” to use the language. The online discourses surrounding each actor have roots in their contexts and histories as important Peruvian figures, which I outline as follows.

The crucial differences regarding the affective stance taken in reaction to Quechua usage by Fujimori and Pizarro reflect several spatial and temporal differences. First, it is necessary to remember that these events took place within four years of each other, which is an eon in virtual spaces. One explanation of the difference in reactions could be the doubling of Peruvian Twitter users during these four years—from two to four million. This increase could have resulted in more users with different opinions about languages; moreover, it is possible that these users are more conscious of multilingual realities, given the initiatives in favor of indigenous languages in the past few years by the government, the market, and civil society.

Second, the contexts and social practices between these two interactions are vastly different. The first event occurred during a presidential candidate debate, while the second took place during a soccer championship, immediately after those games in which Peru’s team had won. Obviously, the first event was never going to inspire as many positive and pride-filled reactions as the second, and this most likely had a direct effect on the reactions towards Quechua usage, beyond the perceptions of the actors involved.
in these events. Third, while Fujimori’s greeting took place in Peru, Pizarro tweeted in Quechua from Chile, a country with which Peru has had a historically conflictual relationship. In this sense, there is the possibility that tweeting from a soccer game in Chile gave Pizarro more “right” to use Quechua, as part of the construction of Peruvian identity that often emerges in these contexts in relation with other nationalities. Moreover, the fact that Pizarro lived outside of Peru and that some comments also came from outside the country could have further incited an emphasis on Peruvian identity over other identities. What is of note in this case is that people legitimized the use of Quechua as part of this Peruvian identity.

Lastly, readers with knowledge of Peruvian politics will know well that Keiko Fujimori and her family are polemic figures in this environment. Her father, Alberto Fujimori, undertook controversial reforms during his time as president, including violations of human rights and corrupt practices, for which he was imprisoned until recently. Although many Peruvians still support him, there are many others who have negative feelings towards him and his daughter, who assumed the role of First Lady during his presidency. This lack of support is clearly reflected in the tweets responding to the greeting. Moreover, if we examine the places in Peru from which the greatest number of tweets were issued, we note that these tweets primarily come from districts in Lima such as Miraflores, San Borja, Lince, Magdalena, and the exurbs of Lima—all of which supported other candidates in the first round of the presidential elections (Gestión, 2015; ONPE, 2011). Thus, we could speculate that these negative tweets could have emerged mainly from those districts in Lima that did not support Fujimori even before her greeting in Quechua.

However, it is important to mention that Claudio Pizarro has also been the target of much criticism by Peruvians on Twitter as well as other mediums. For example, in response to an article entitled “Claudio Pizarro y lo que hace cuando lo critican en Twitter” [Claudio Pizarro and what he does when he is criticized on Twitter], some commenters called him “baboso” [slimy] “sinvergüenza” [shameless] and “calienta bancas” [seat warmer], suggesting that Pizarro is not always the adored character seen in the tweets analyzed previously (Perú.com, 2015c; see also Brañez-Medina, 2015, for an analysis of Pizarro’s questioned masculinity). These criticisms also appeared in some of the responses to his tweets in Quechua, although none of them made a direct reference to his use of the language. The article cited previously also noted that Pizarro plays an active role on his Twitter page, including blocking responses that he does not like, which could explain the difference in the reactions analyzed previously. However, these actions did not seem to take place with the few negative responses that were analyzed, leaving us to question how much monitoring Pizarro actually did during these events.

Given that Fujimori and Pizarro are both polemic figures in Peruvian public life, it is therefore possible to go beyond the controversies mentioned previously and analyze the reactions to their use of Quechua under the lens
of racial and essentialist ideologies. In the reactions to Fujimori’s greeting, we see a highly racialized language, which differs greatly from the language of responses to Pizarro. First, the negative stance taken towards Fujimori indicates a profound racism towards Asians through the discourses of difference and deviance. Instead of directly criticizing Fujimori’s policies, or those of her father, most commenters opted to use words such as “china [Chinese woman/girl]” “minpao (a Chinese bread also used to refer to people of Chinese origin),” and “koreano [sic] [Korean],” all of which reflect a profound lack of awareness of the differences between Asian ethnic groups. This ignorance is indexed in the discourse of difference proposed by Van Dijk (2002), in which “everything different is the same;” in other words, all Asians are “Chinese,” even when they are Japanese. This discourse of difference is absent in the responses to Pizarro’s tweets; with the exception of the “joke” about the “ugly Indian” discussed previously, the majority of the commenters praised Pizarro for his use of Quechua and used a language of inclusion. By writing in Quechua, Pizarro was categorized as an authentic Peruvian, a “wayki [brother]” who had found his “true” identity, despite not having indigenous ancestry.

Racialized language towards Fujimori persisted in the tweets corresponding to a discourse of deviance, in which commenters assumed that, by speaking Quechua, she was doing something she “shouldn’t.” The frequent appearance of words such as “falso” [false] and “hipócrita” [hypocrite], combined with various onomatopoeic and emoticon expressions of laughter when confronted with the idea of a “china” speaking Quechua, did not only illuminate opinions about Fujimori’s policies, but also the belief that a greeting in the language went against her linguistic norms.

Yet although Pizarro did not grow up in the Andes or speak Quechua, he was given authority to use the language, possibly due to the contextual reasons mentioned previously, or perhaps for being positioned as having a phenotype that appeared more “common” or “normal” with respect to the typical Peruvian. Whether due to context or ethno-racial identification, commenters linked Quechua directly to Pizarro’s identity, which demonstrated an attitude of approval regarding his use of the language. Similar to the rejection of Fujimori’s Quechua usage, this attitude reflected essentialist ideologies that restricted the possibilities of speaking Quechua to a distinct group. This perspective is also seen in traditional mass media reports on these two discursive events, as discussed previously, in which Fujimori is accused of using the language as a “strategy” while Pizarro is praised for “promoting” Quechua.

Given these observations, we can posit that both racialized discourses towards Fujimori, as well as expressions of pride and happiness towards Pizarro, did not only take place due to their histories as famous Peruvian entities, but also due to how they have been ethnically and racially constructed by the commenters before and during these discursive events. Fujimori’s attempt to speak an autochthonous Peruvian language generated
comments that positioned her as an outsider who “feigned” a Peruvian identity, although Fujimori is a native of Peru. At the same time, Pizarro was constructed as an intimate member of the Peruvian population and as a “natural” speaker of the language despite only knowing a few words, and despite his long residences abroad in Europe. What do these constructions signify for ideologies of race, ethnicity, and language in Peru, as well as for the role of citizen sociolinguistics in social media? In the section to follow I outline some key implications and final thoughts.

Implications and Conclusions

In this chapter I have proposed that data from the Web 2.0, such as social media sites, can be a rich source for analyzing ideologies unmediated by researcher queries towards the multilingualism and multiculturalism of certain populations. In the space of Peruvian Twitter, composed of both resident Peruvians and those living in the diaspora, we have seen how the affective stances taken by users, whether positive or negative, reflect essentialist attitudes about the use of certain languages. Although politicians and soccer players alike will receive their fair share of negative press in virtual or “real world” spaces, and although we must not ignore the contextual, spatial, and temporal factors mentioned previously that impacted these discursive events, I argue that the racialized language used by Fujimori’s critics went beyond a mere critique of her political views and those of her father. Indeed, the discourse surrounding Fujimori’s greeting in Quechua contains vestiges of Peru’s historic racism, where the Other is simultaneously different and restricted to operating within certain linguistic parameters, according to his or her ethnic history. Meanwhile, a soccer player positioned by participants as more ethnically similar to his fans, tweeting in Quechua from abroad, can be included in an intimate, insider circle of Peruvians, despite his not speaking the language.

These observations suggest that there is still much to do regarding the promotion of multilingualism in Peru, whether on or offline. If Quechua and other indigenous languages continue to be restricted to certain populations, it is doubtful that they will survive; indeed, similar findings have been discovered regarding the use of Quichua in Ecuador (Back, 2015). However, if stakeholders could promote the idea that indigenous languages are for everyone, similar to Pizarro’s stated intentions with his tweets, inclusive practices could enable these languages to survive beyond their original populations. Social media is a tool that offers a great deal with respect to this promotion, as we see in the commenter who, inspired by Pizarro’s tweets, began to take Quechua lessons on YouTube.

Finally, we note in these examples that citizen sociolinguistics can be a double-edged sword with respect to negotiating and contesting linguistic ideologies. Although some participants took unique and critical perspectives on the actors’ use of Quechua, the majority of participant reactions appeared
to either reinforce racialized discourses surrounding a polemic political figure (Fujimori) or conflated a popular soccer player with an unclaimed indigenous heritage (Pizarro). With this analysis, we note the role of social media in promoting essentialist discourses of language and race through the lens of citizen sociolinguistics. It remains to be seen if these promotions remain the norm in these types of reactions, or if citizen sociolinguistics can be employed as a tool to bring forth a more critical awareness of race and language, and thus effect real change in how these categories are perceived.

Notes
1. Web 2.0 refers to online content characterized by its interactive, multimodal nature. The term “Web 2.0” is in contrast to the so-called “Web 1.0,” which is associated with a moment in Internet history when content was more static and less subject to user interaction.
2. An update on Twitter changed the name of the “Favorites” button to “Likes” in an attempt to facilitate and extend its usage.
3. At the time of the 2011 presidential debates, Fujimori’s father was imprisoned in Peru on corruption charges and human rights violations.
4. The term “caviar” in Peru refers to a type of well-meaning, upper middle-class Peruvian of European origin.
5. Pizarro’s soccer career included extended periods of playing soccer for the German clubs Bayern Munich and Werder Bremen.
6. This last sentence refers to Pizarro’s award by Chile’s National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI), mentioned previously in this chapter.
7. It was not possible to locate all of the commenters via geotagging or other location devices, although some of the commenter biographies did note that they lived outside of Peru.

References
Michele Back


